12 CHAPTER 獨占競爭與寡占. 12 CHAPTER 獨占競爭與寡占 C H A P T E R C H E C K L I S T 學習本章後，您將能： 眾多彼此競爭的廠商 廠商生產差異化的產品 1 廠商生產差異化的產品 2 廠商價格、品質與行銷上的兢爭 3 廠商可以自由加入或退出市場.
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Präsentation zum Thema: "12 CHAPTER 獨占競爭與寡占. 12 CHAPTER 獨占競爭與寡占 C H A P T E R C H E C K L I S T 學習本章後，您將能： 眾多彼此競爭的廠商 廠商生產差異化的產品 1 廠商生產差異化的產品 2 廠商價格、品質與行銷上的兢爭 3 廠商可以自由加入或退出市場."— Präsentation transkript:
3 C H A P T E R C H E C K L I S T 學習本章後，您將能： 眾多彼此競爭的廠商 廠商生產差異化的產品 1廠商生產差異化的產品2廠商價格、品質與行銷上的兢爭3廠商可以自由加入或退出市場4
4 12.1 獨占競爭的定義 獨占競爭 的特徵為： 眾多彼此競爭的廠商 廠商生產差異化的產品 廠商在價格、品質與行銷上的競爭 廠商可以自由加入或退出市場Students have no difficulty seeing monopolistic competition in the world all around them. Emphasize that the work they’ve just done understanding the models of perfect competition and monopoly are not wasted because the real-world situation of monopolistic competition, as its name implies, is a mixture of both extremes. Some of what they learned in each of the two previous chapters survives and operates in the middle ground of monopolistic competition.
6 產品差異化 12.1 獨占競爭的定義 產品差異化 指創造自家產品與競爭對手間的些微差異 差異化的產品具有密切替代品，但沒有完全替代品 因此價格上漲將導致需求量減少Product differentiation is the heart of the space between monopoly and competition. An old ice-cream on the beach analogy really nails down the idea of product differentiation and explains how monopolistic competition fills the space between monopoly and perfect competition. Draw a line on the blackboard and label the two ends A and B. Tell the students that the line represents a long beach along which beachgoers are uniformly spaced. An ice-cream vendor decides to set up shop on the beach—the only one. Where will she locate? The students will quickly see that the center—midway between A and B is the spot that will get most customers because the cost of an ice-cream is the market price plus the walking time to get it (remind them that the beach is very long!) Now a second ice-cream vendor opens up. Where does he locate? With a bit of help, the students will see that the best spot is right next to the first one. With one producer, there is monopoly and no variety—no product differentiation. With two producers, there is still no differentiation— technically, there is minimum differentiation. Now suppose a third and fourth ice-cream vendor come along. Where do they locate? At the ends of the beach at A and B. They differentiate as much as possible from each other and from the first two. Further entry has new ice-cream vendors locating in the middle of the gaps between the existing ones, always going into the widest gap. If the market could stand the competition, eventually, there would be ice-cream vendors so close to each other all along the beach that the members of any adjacent group were indistinguishable to a customer. Product differentiation would have been pushed to the point that there is no “space” for additional variety and the market would look like perfect competition.Real products are like the beach example. Talk about sports shoes, breakfast cereals, and any other goods that interest you and for which there are good locally observable examples and encourage the students to see that they are like the beach example. The variety of products fill the available variety “space.”
12 12.1 產量與價格決定 1. 利潤極大化發生在 MR = MC. 2. 利潤極大化的產量等於 125 件/天 3. 利潤極大化的價格為 $75 /件While students have gotten familiar with the demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost curves over the past two chapters, still take the time to point out the curves as you draw them. Use actual numbers for quantity and priceUnlike the case of perfect competition, the demand curve for a firm’s differentiated product in monopolistic competition is downward sloping. Remind the students about the ceteris paribus condition that defines a demand curve. Along the demand curve for Nike tennis shoes, the prices of Adidas, Fila, Head, K Swiss, Prince, Reebok, and Wilson tennis shoes are constant. Some people prefer Nike to the other brands and will pay a bit more for Nike. Other people prefer some other brand and will buy Nike only if its price is low enough. Buyers have brand preferences, but they will switch brands if price differences are large enough. So the higher the price of a Nike shoe, the prices of the other brands remaining the same, the smaller is the quantity of Nike shoes demanded.ATC 為 $25 /件4. 經濟利潤為 $6,250 /天
14 12.1 產量與價格決定 1. 利潤極大化的產量等於 75 件/天 2. 價格等於 $50 件，也等於平均總成本 3. 經濟利潤等於 0 Students seem to have a bit of trouble appreciating that entry and exit change the demand for a firm’s product. Explain this effect by sticking with the tennis shoes example. Explain that the demand for Nike tennis shoes changes and the demand curve for Nike tennis shoes shifts if other firms enter or exit. If Tommy Hilfiger and the Gap started to make tennis shoes, some of Nike’s former customers would switch to these two new brands, and the demand for Nike shoes would decrease. The demand curve for Nike shoes would shift leftward. If Adidas, Fila, and Reebok stopped making tennis shoes, some of their former customers would switch to like, and the demand for Nike shoes would increase. The demand curve for Nike shoes would shift rightward.3. 經濟利潤等於 0
34 何謂賽局 12.4 賽局理論 囚犯兩難 所有的賽局都有三種特徵： 規則 策略 報償 顯示兩囚犯間為何難以互相合作的一場賽局 The prisoners’ dilemma is a great way to start this lecture. Tell students they get to play a game and get two students to volunteer to be the “criminals.” Give the entire class the story and rules. Don’t use a payoff matrix at this point, just write the options on the board. Then send one of your volunteers out of the room. Ask the remaining student what strategy he or she will take. Get your class to help. It usually takes a few minutes for everyone to agree that confessing is the best strategy. Send the first student from the room and then call in the second student. Ask this student what he or she will do. Because the class already knows what the first student has done, encourage them not to tell. Aid the students as they move toward choosing the equilibrium. Encourage students to remember this gaming strategy because it is the same material that you’ll use to describe a firm’s behavior.You can actually play the prisoner’s dilemma game online. A good Web version of the game can be found on a site operated by a group called Serendip at Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania. The URL for the web site is If you can use the Web in your classroom, open two browsers and go to this site twice. Get two teams trying to beat Serendip.
40 雙頭寡占的兩難 12.4 賽局理論 每家公司皆有兩種策略： 每週生產 3 架飛機 每週生產 4 架飛機 The duopolist’s dilemma game on pages and revisited on pages 413–414 has been carefully designed to get the maximum payoff from the knowledge your students have of the perfect competition and monopoly results of the two preceding chapters and to introduce them to game theory in a setting that is as close to the previously studied settings as possible. Instead of asserting a payoff matrix on pages , the numbers in the matrix come directly from monopoly profit-maximizing and competitive outcomes calculated on the earlier pages. You need to do a bit of work to generate the payoff numbers, but the whole story hangs together so much better when the student can see where the numbers come from and can see the connection between the oligopoly set up and those of competition and monopoly. Start with Figure 16.2 on page 396 and after you’ve explained the cost and demand conditions shown in the figure, ask the students what they think the price and quantity will be in this industry. There will be differences of opinion. This diversity of opinion motivates the need for a model of the choices the firms make.
43 12.4 賽局理論 雙頭寡占的均衡 皆每週生產 4 架飛機 同囚犯兩難，雙頭寡占 的均衡得到的非最佳結 果 同囚犯兩難，雙頭寡占 的均衡得到的非最佳結 果Determining the Nash equilibrium of a game is often difficult for students. Try to make the game more “practical” by pointing out to the students that in the real world, real firms are almost always doing ”what if” analyses and that game theory is well designed for answering these sorts of “what if” questions. In the Airbus/Boeing game in the text, the two companies are trying to determine how many airplanes they should produce if their competitor produces 3 airplanes or if their competitor produces 4 airplanes. You can illustrate the equilibrium by starting with Airbus and stating that Airbus wants to determine what it should do if Boeing produces 4 airplanes. Then, after determining that Airbus will produce 4 airplanes, do the next “what if” by looking what Airbus should do if Boeing produces 3 airplanes. In this case, Airbus again wants to produce 4 airplanes. Therefore Airbus’s “what if” analysis has led to the conclusion that regardless of Boeing’s decision, Airbus wants to produce 4 airplanes. You can conduct the same “what if” for Boeing’s choices and determine that Boeing, too, will produce 4 airplanes regardless of Airbus’s choice.