The consequence of the EMU and the role of International Monetary Institutions after the World Financial Crises: Some preliminary ideas using Constitutional.

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1 The consequence of the EMU and the role of International Monetary Institutions after the World Financial Crises: Some preliminary ideas using Constitutional Economics WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA1 of 48 Vorlesung/publicchoiceWS2011_PC13.ppt

2 EMU & IMF after world financial crises - Content 1.Introduction 2.The consequences of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 3.The new challenging tasks of the International Monetary Fund under the aspect of the world financial crises 4.Some theoretical ideas, about the functioning of a new International Monetary Institution should work 5.Some ideas about the institutional design of a new International Monetary Institution 6.Summary and conclusions WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA2 of 48

3 1. Introduction 1.The consequences of the EMU 2.Do we need a new or reformed IMF with respect to the global financial crises? 3.If so how should this institution look like? WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA3 of 48

4 Table 2.1: Positive and negative expectations of the European Monetary Union (EMU) Positive expectationsEconomic theory (1)Economic growth (in general) (2)(Faster) development/convergence of less developed EU-countries New growth theory Negative expectations (1)Higher inflation, especially in low inflation EU-countries (2)Increased (and permanent) one-sided transfer payments Bail out problem Big problem!!! New stabilization theory; theory of optimum currency areas 2. The Consequences of the EMU WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA4 of 48

5 (1)Economic Growth (2)Faster growth of less developed EU-countries The direct development-enhancing effects are: -the removal of exchange rate uncertainties; -(the expected) rise in direct foreign investment; and -a possible increase of financial transfers to the less developed European Union countries. Indirect development-enhancing effects include all the positive stabilization effects – like: -the discipline forced by the convergence criteria too weak!!! -the credibility gained from the European Central Bank, and -an increase in political stability. 2.1. Positive expectations of the EMU WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA5 of 48

6 The negative expectations of the European Monetary Union are: (1)Higher inflation in the low inflation EU-countries, (2)Conflicts between EU-members because of large one-sided transfer payments, or how to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria, and (3)Bail out of almost bankrupt countries like Greece, Portugal and Ireland!!! 2.2. Negative expectations of the EMU WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA6 of 48

7 Table 2.2: Institutional precautions/arrangements of the EMU Institutional arrangements: 1. In the Maastricht treaty 1.1. Statute of the ECBi.Commitment to price stability ii.Independence of the ECB iii.Prohibition of government deficit financing 1.2. No bail-out clause, too weakReform necessary!!! 1.3. Fiscal convergence criteriai.Government budget deficit ii.Government overall debt 1.4. Monetary structural convergence criteria i.Inflation convergence ii.Long term interest rate convergence iii.Exchange rate stabilization 2. Stability pactFiscal and budgetary discipline 2.3. The Institutional Set-up of the EMU WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA7 of 48

8 Stability of the Euro depends on the following four factors: (1)size of transaction domain, (2)stability of monetary policy, (3)stability of the political system and (4)fall-back value. 2.3. The Institutional Set-up of the EMU It is obvious, that a currency, which is used by a hundred million people, is much more liquid than a currency which is money for one million people. The larger the single currency area, the better it can act as a cushion against shocks. Ad 1: Size of transaction domain WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA8 of 48

9 Ad 2: Stability of the monetary policy The stability of the Euro depends on the institutional arrangements which proved so far to be successful. 2.3. The Institutional Set-up of the EMU Ad 3: Stability of the political system Long term monetary stability, of course, depends on monetary policy, and monetary policy is in turn affected by political stability. Strong international currencies have always been linked to strong and stable governments. Problem: How to handle the case of almost bankrupt countries? WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA9 of 48

10 Most modern currencies (like the EURO) have no real fall-back factor as the older currencies had, which were either gold or silver standards or convertible into one or both of those metals. Ad 4: The fall-back factor In sum, the Euro has two weaknesses: it is not backed by an European Federal Union and it has no real fall-back value. 2.3. The Institutional Set-up of the EMU (1)For most western EU-countries it was worthwhile to shift domestic monetary policy to a transnational (European) level. The expectation is a stable hard currency and low inflation rates but also a better predictability of monetary policy, which has been met up to now! (2)Hence such a change from a domestic institutional monetary arrangement to a transnational one may be worthwhile to consider also for other countries. Two Preliminary Conclusions WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA10 of 48

11 3. The New and Challenges Task of the IMF after the World Financial Crises (1)The IMF is quite often severely criticized for his policy measures especially in crises periods. (2)Quite often a major reform of the IMF and of other financial institutions is demanded. (3)One outflow of this discussion is the request of a Tobin tax which should be monitored or executed by an international financial institution. (4)Also a better monitoring and hopefully a prevention of financial crises is demanded. WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA11 of 48

12 4.1. The economic and political independence of monetary institutions (1)The modern theory of financial institutions stresses the importance of the independence of these institutions and of the incentive structures of the decision makers responsible for monetary policy. (2)Economic independence is defined as the ability of the monetary institution to determine the use and choice of its monetary (and if necessary other) policy instruments to act autonomously. (3)Political independence is defined as the ability of the monetary institution to choose monetary policy goals autonomously and without interference from the government. WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA12 of 48

13 4.2. Institutional solutions Two approaches of independent monetary institutions can be differentiated: (1)Rogoffs (1985) approach to delegate monetary policy to an independent central banker and (2)The contracting approach by Walsh (1995). Both theories have in common, that they propose the establishment of monetary institution structures which permit monetary policy to react to economic disturbances independently, i.e. without interference from the government. WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA13 of 48

14 4.3. A Suggestion of a New IMF Institutional arrangements 1. Statute of the IMF1.1 Commitment to stable currencies 1.2 Commitment to price and fiscal stability 1.3 Independence of the new IMF from donor countries 2. No bail-out clause or a bail-out clause with strict rules 3. Fiscal convergence criteria (pre fixed limits) of 3.1 Government currencies budget deficit 3.2 Government overall debt 4. Monetary structural convergence criteria 4.1 Inflation convergence 4.2 Long term interest rate convergence 4.3 Exchange rate stabilization Table 1: Institutional precautions/arrangements for a new IMF WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA14 of 48

15 4.3. A Suggestion of a New IMF – cont. (3) Fiscal Policy i.the no-bail-out clause or one with strict rules to be known ex-ante in advance!!! ii.to each country specific set up of the fiscal convergence criteria, which restrict the government budget deficit and the overall government debt to certain (politically accepted) levels. WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA15 of 48

16 5. Some ideas about the institutional design of a new IMF (1)If this new or reformed institution is called for help, it should be layed down in an agreement between the affected country and this institution, that this organization may act like a completely independent central bank but coming from outside. (2)For a certain period of time one should give this monetary institution the task and (political) authority, to act like a independent central bank. (3) The idea is, that on the one side the moral hazard problem of the IMF (i.e. the IMF is a lender of last resort and bails out these countries) is considerably reduced and that this new monetary institution has a strong incentive to undertake policies for the affected country, which are suited best for it. 5.1. General Remarks WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA16 of 48

17 (4) As the financial help from the donor countries depends on the success to overcome the crises in this country, there are strong incentives for this new institution to act accordingly. (5) On the other side there are now considerable higher costs for affected countries, because the governments in these countries loose a considerable part of their (monetary and fiscal policy) power, strong pressure can be put on them from the new financial institution to undertake necessary reforms, and (may be most important) the easy bail-out option does not exist any more! 5.1. General Remarks – cont. 5. Some ideas about the institutional design of a new IMF WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA17 of 48

18 A two-tier banking system means, that there should be a new strong and independent central bank and this new monetary institution should play this role as soon as possible and it should build up a number of competitive commercial (private) banks. 5.2. A two-tier banking system 5. Some ideas about the institutional design of a new IMF WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA18 of 48

19 (1)A main precondition for an efficient conduct of monetary policy is a well functioning market-based banking system. (2)In order to enable commercial banks to function effectively under market conditions, a deregulation and sometimes privatization of these institutions might be necessary as well as an adequate supervisory capacity, because a weak and inefficient banking system hinders or even prevent a successful monetary policy. 5.3. Thorough restructuring of the banking system 5. Some ideas about the institutional design of a new IMF WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA19 of 48

20 (1)Pressures from the fiscal policy side can make the commitment of the international monetary institution to follow a steady anti-inflationary policy incredible since the sustainability of such a policy is doubted. (2)This problem can only be overcome if some control mechanisms on the fiscal authority are established, like in the Maastricht treaty in the case of the European Monetary Union, however with a better and more effective sanction mechanism. 5.4. Establishment of control mechanisms on the fiscal authority 5. Some ideas about the institutional design of a new IMF WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA20 of 48

21 (1)In a perfect world all of the above mentioned institutional changes should be implemented instantly – and hence it would also be desirable to implement all reform elements simultaneously. This, however, is wishful thinking. (2)The problem of sequencing and of making a wrong decision respecting the sequence of reform steps cannot be neglected. (3) For example it is not sufficient to have formerly independent monetary institutions in such crises countries, if they have not the sufficient institutional and political support for such a step. 5.5. Implementation problems 5. Some ideas about the institutional design of a new IMF WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA21 of 48

22 (4) In order to strengthen the position of the monetary institution and to enhance the credibility of ist announcements, there are two ways to improve the situation: The first way is to implement appropriate institutional control mechanism in order to control the inflation driving authorities or groups (such as the fiscal authority and wage price setting groups). Or one could bring forward the idea of the introduction of consti-tutional restriction of government debt. The second way is to choose an appropriate nominal anchor in order to conduct monetary policy successfully (e.g. a currency board). 5.5. Implementation problems (cont.) WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA22 of 48

23 (1)The European Monetary system has become a legal and institutional framework from which a stable currency resulted so far. This changes the picture of the world financial system because two major currencies operate in this financial system which are competitors and where the rate between the Euro and the US-$ is a crucial factor. (2)In the light of this and the world financial crises a first attempt is made to put forward some ideas of a more powerful and effective new international monetary organisation. It is argued that only the policies of this organization will be successful, if it is really independent especially from its major donors and hence can act independently if it is called for help in certain countries. 6. Summary and conclusions WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA23 of 48

24 (3)It is important, that various instruments could be developed for this new organization giving him a status like an independent central bank in an affected country for a certain time period, so that this organization can really control the monetary policy and has the appropriate instruments to interfere within the country fiscal policy aspects, so that the goals of this institution can really put through. 6. Summary and conclusions WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA24 of 48

25 Figur A.1: Das jährliche Haushaltsdefizit (laufende Verschuldung aller öff. Gebietskörperschaften in % des BIP) Griechenlands über 1995 bis 2010 Quelle: OECD, Paris, 2010. 2010: Prognose EU-Kommission in WKO Nov. 2010 25 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

26 Figur A.2: Das jährliche Haushaltsdefizit (laufende Verschuldung aller öff. Gebietskörperschaften in % des BIP) Irlands über 2000 bis 2010 1) 1)Definition der EU: Der Finanzierungssaldo (+/-) des Staates ist die Differenz zwischen Einnahmen und Ausgaben des Staates. Der Sektor Staat gliedert sich in die Teilsektoren Bund (Zentralstaat), Länder, Gemeinden und Sozialversicherungen. Das als gemeinsamer Nenner verwendete BIP ist das Bruttoinlandsprodukt zu jeweiligen Marktpreisen. Quelle: EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, Download 10.11.2010 2010 (Stand Okt. 2010): Prognose auf http://www.euractiv.de/finanzplatz-europa/artikel/irland-und-griechenland-bleiben-sorgenkinder-der-eu-003827; Download 10.11.2010 26 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

27 Figur A.3: Die aktuelle Situation Griechenlands 27 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

28 Figur A.4: Konsolidierter Bruttoschuldenstand des Staates Irland in Prozent des BIP 1) 1)Kurzbeschreibung: Defintion der EU: Der Sektor Staat gliedert sich in die Teilsektoren Bund (Zentralstaat), Länder, Gemeinden und Sozialversicherungen. Das als gemeinsamer Nenner verwendete BIP ist das Bruttoinlandsprodukt zu jeweiligen Marktpreisen. Als Schuldenstand gilt der Nominalwert (Nennwert), Fremdwährungsschulden werden zu Jahresend-Devisenmarktkursen in die Landeswährung umgerechnet (mit gesonderten Bestimmungen für Verträge). Die nationalen Daten für den Sektor Staat sind zwischen den Untersektoren konsolidiert. Die Grunddaten liegen in Landeswährung vor und werden anhand der von der Europäischen Zentralbank gelieferten Wechselkurse zum Jahresende in Euro umgerechnet. Quelle: EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, Download 10.11.2010; 2010: Prognose EU-Kommission in WKO Nov. 2010http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 28 von 48 Staatsverschuldung in % des BIP Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

29 Figur A.5: Wachstumsrate des BIP-Volumens in Irland - prozentuale Veränderung relativ zum Vorjahr 1) Quelle: EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, Download 11.11.2010 2010 u. 2011 Prognose EU-Kommisssion IWF: -0,3 29 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

30 Quelle: EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, Download 11.11.2010 Oktober 2010 (Monatswert): http://www.bmsk.gv.at/cms/site/attachments/5/4/6/CH0735/CMS1288602401005/arbeitsmarkt_europa_201010.pdf Figur A.6: Arbeitslosenquote, Irland 2000 –2010 30 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

31 Figur A.7: Die Größe der Schattenwirtschaft (in % des offiziellen BIP) in 21 OECD- Ländern von 2010 Quelle: Eigene Berechnungen, 2010 (Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, Altenbergerstr. 69, A-4040 Linz/Auhof). Durchschnittswert: 14.0 31 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

32 Tabelle A.1: Makroökonomische Prognosen von Griechenland und der EU (Sommer 2010) Variable / Größe20092010201120122013 Prognose BIP Griechisches Finanzministerium -2.0-0.31.51.92.5 Prognose BIP EU-2.0-4.0-2.1-1.50.7 Prognose Arbeitslosenquote Griechisches Finanzministerium 9.009.910.5 10.3 Prognose Arbeitslosenquote EU 9.014.316.919.018.0 Prognose Öffentliche Verschuldung Griechisches Finanzministerium 113.4120.4120.6117.7113.4 Prognose Öffentliche Verschuldung EU 113.4123.1127.0129.0127.1 Quellen: EU und Griechisches Finanzministerium 32 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

33 33 von 48 Tabelle A.2: Die Finanzhilfen für Portugal, Irland und Griechenland in Milliarden Euro SCHÄTZUNG Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

34 34 von 52 Tabelle A.3: Die Wirtschafts- und Verschuldungs - Situation von Portugal, Irland, Griechenland und Österreich in 2010 Land Wachstum in % des BIP 2010 (BIP pro Kopf in )) [BIP Mrd. ] Arbeitslose in % 2010 [Einwohner in Mio.] laufendes Defizit in % des BIP 2010 Schuldenstand In % des BIP 2010 Anteil am BIP der EURO Länder (2009) in Prozent Griechenland -4,5 -(20.400) -[230] 14,1 [11,3] - 10,7140,23% Irland -1,0 -(34.200) -[154] 14,9 [4,5] -32,497,42% Portugal 1,3 (16.300) [173] 11,1 [10,6] - 8,682,82% Österreich 2,6 (33.900) [285] 3,2 [9,2] [-5,5]77,93,7% Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

35 Figur A.8: Der Schuldenstand und Haushaltsdefizit in den Euro-Ländern (2010; in Prozent des BIP) Höchstgrenze laut Euro-Stabilitätspakt: 60% des BIP Quelle: OECD, EU-Kommission (Prognose) 35 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

36 Figur A.9: Der Schuldenstand und Haushaltsdefizit in den Euro-Ländern (2010; in Prozent des BIP); Höchstgrenze für laufendes Defizit: 3% des BIP Quelle: OECD, EU-Kommission (Prognose) 36 von 48 3 % Grenze Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

37 Tabelle A.4: Defizit und Verschuldung in 13 kleinen offenen EU-Ländern Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, Juni 2010 EU-Länder = Euroland Budget-Defizit (-) Überschuss (+) Gesamter Schuldenstand in Prozent des BIP Jahr 2008 Jahr 2009 Veränd.Jahr 2008Jahr 2009 Veränd. Belgien -1,2-6,0 4,889,896,7 6,90 Dänemark3,4-2,7 6,134,241,6 7,40 Estland-2,7-1,7 -1,04,67,2 2,60 Finnland 4,2-2,2 6,634,244,0 9,80 Griechenland -7,7-13,6 5,999,2115,1 16,0 Luxemburg 2,9-0,7 3,613,714,5 0,80 Niederlande 0,7-5,3 6,058,260,9 2,70 Österreich -0,4-3,4 3,062,666,5 3,90 Portugal -2,8-9,4 6,666,376,8 10,50 Schweden2,5-0,5 3,038,342,3 1,96 Slowenien -1,7-5,5 3,822,635,9 13,30 Spanien -4,1-11,2 7,139,753,2 13,50 Tschechien-2,7-5,9 3,230,035,4 5,40 Euro-16 ε -2,0-6,3 4,369,478,7 9,30 EU-27 -2,3-6,8 4,561,673,6 12,0 Quelle: EU Kommission, Brüssel 2010. 37 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

38 Figur A.10: Refinanzierungsvolumina von Staatsanleihen der Euro- Problemstaaten (Anleihen, die in den nächsten 30 Jahren auslaufen und durch neue Schuldpapiere ersetzt werden müssen) in Milliarden Euro 2011 und 2012 Quellen: Deutsche Bank, OECD, Paris 2010. 38 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

39 Figur A.11.: Zinssätze für 10jährige Staatsanleihen, Teil 1 (Mai 2010) 39 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

40 Figur: A.12: Entwicklung Absicherungsprämienaufschläge einiger Länder Gemessen an Zehnjahres-Credit-Default-Swaps (CDS) in Dollar: Lesehilfe: CDS-Prämie von 300 = die Absicherung auf einen 10-Millionen-Dollar-Kredit kostet 300.000 Dollar; Quelle: Bloomberg 40 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

41 Tabelle A.5: Konsolidierte Auslandsforderungen von Banken der BIZ-Länder 1) gegenüber ausgewählten Ländern Land Ins- gesamt Mrd. $ Davon in Frank- reich Mrd. $ Deutsch- land Mrd. $ Nieder- lande Mrd. $ Großbritan nien Mrd. $ Vereinigte Staaten Mrd. $ Deutsch- land % Frank- reich % Griechenland202,671,144,211,311,813,621,835,1 Irland627,650,3174,025,9164,060,621,78,0 Portugal243,642,144,512,225,05,218,317,3 Spanien857,0199,8213,199,5110,262,224,923,3 Zusammen1930,8363,3475,8149,0311,0141,724,618,8 1) Länder, die der Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich (BIZ) berichten; Stand: Ende 2010. Quelle: BIZ, Basel, 2010. 41 von 48 Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

42 42 von 48 Figur A.13: Der EURO-Stabilitätsmechanismus (ESM), Beiträge der EURO Länder zum ESM in Mird. Euro Appendix: A1 Some Facts and Figures of the EU Debt Crises

43 Appendix: Schlussfolgerungen – Was können wir tun? (1)Hilfe für potentiell bankrotte Staaten oder Umschuldung (z.B. Griechenland, Irland, Portugal, Belgien) (i)Haircuts vor Bürgschaften / Krediten / Umschuldung Die Staatengemeinschaft (EU) bürgt nur dann mit Krediten oder Ersatzanleihen, wenn die privaten Gläubiger zuvor auf einen substantiellen Teil ihrer Forderungen (mind. 30%) verzichtet haben. Quelle: Sinn und Carstensen, ifo, 2010. 43 von 48

44 Appendix: Schlussfolgerungen – Was können wir tun? (1)Hilfe für potentiell bankrotte Staaten (ii)Collective Action Clause (CAC) Collective Action Clause ermöglicht eine vertragliche Vereinbarung der Gläubiger mit dem Schuldnerland, die dann allgemein verbindlich wird. Der Erlös aus dem Verkauf der CAC Papiere soll zu ordnungsgemäßen Bedingungen der Altkredite dienen, zu denen auch die Kredite der Staatengemeinschaften zählen. Quelle: Sinn und Carstensen, ifo, 2010. 44 von 48

45 Appendix: Schlussfolgerungen- Was können wir tun? (Forts.) (2) Ergänzung/Änderung des Maastrichter Vertrages Möglichkeit eines (i) Austritts- und (ii) Ausschließungsrechtes eines Landes aus dem Währungsverbund. (i)Austrittsrecht: Ein Staat kann aus der Währungsunion austreten, wenn dafür in dem Land die erforderlichen parlamentarischen oder direkt- demokratischen Mehrheiten gegeben sind. 45 von 48

46 Appendix: Schlussfolgerungen- Was können wir tun? (Forts.) (2) Ergänzung/Änderung des Maastrichter Vertrages (ii) Ausschließungsrecht: (1)Wann Ausschluss für Verletzung der Kriterien des Maastrichter Vertrages? Vorschlag: Verletzung der Kriterien eines Landes ohne besondere Notlage über zwei Jahre. (2)Welche Mehrheit für den Ausschluss und Ausschluss dauerhaft oder nur temporär? Vorschlag: Qualifizierte (zB 2/3) Mehrheit. Sobald das Land die Maastrichter Kriterien wieder erfüllt, kann es wieder mit einer qualifizierten Mehrheit der Euroländer aufgenommen werden. 46 von 48

47 Appendix: Schlussfolgerungen- Was können wir tun? (Forts.) (2) Ergänzung/Änderung des Maastrichter Vertrages (iii) Neu-Definition der Verschuldungsgrenzen - Aufgabe der starren Grenzwerte (3% und 60%!) (1)Laufende Verschuldung: Durchschnittswert der 4 Länder mit dem tiefsten Wert +/- 1.5 Prozentpunkte (2)Gesamte Staatsverschuldung: Durchschnittswert der 4 Länder mit dem tiefsten Wert +/- 5.0 Prozentpunkte und (3)Übergangszeit von 10-15 Jahren ist notwendig 47 von 48

48 Source Friedrich Schneider, The role of International Monetary Institutions after the Euro and the Globalisation: Some Preliminary Ideas Using Constitutional Economics. published in Arie Arnon and Warren Young (eds.): The Open Economy Macromodel: Past, Present and Future, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, pp.289-305. WS 2011/12 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, AUSTRIA48 of 48