© K Raffer 2015 VL-Unterlagen zu 040589 VO Grundlagen der Entwicklungsökonomie WS 2015-16 Kunibert Raffer.

Präsentation zum Thema: "© K Raffer 2015 VL-Unterlagen zu 040589 VO Grundlagen der Entwicklungsökonomie WS 2015-16 Kunibert Raffer."—  Präsentation transkript:

1 © K Raffer 2015 VL-Unterlagen zu 040589 VO Grundlagen der Entwicklungsökonomie WS 2015-16 Kunibert Raffer

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4 Happy Planet Index Happy Planet Index ≈ Experienced well-being x Life expectancy Ecological Footprint ”At heart, the HPI is a measure of efficiency. It calculates the number of Happy Life Years (life expectancy adjusted for experienced well-being) achieved per unit of resource use.” © NEF

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6 0 ≤ DSR/DSRd* ≤ 1 DSR is the IBRD’s cash-base ratio. DSRd*, is debt service paid plus payments due but not effected. My index - which for the sake of brevity and want of any better name might be called Raffer index - is 1 if all payments are made on time, zero if nothing is paid. Multiplied by 100 it shows actual payments as percentages of debt service due © K Raffer 2013

7 Table A.3: Sub-Saharan Africa's Arrears and Debt Service 1980-1993 (%) 19801986198719881989199019911992 1993 p Debt- (DSR) and Interest-Service-Ratios (ISR) on Cash Base* WDT 1993-94 ISR6.211.4 9.410.3 9.7 9.0 9.2 8.6 7.3 DSR 9.724.919.621.018.018.017.116.913.5 WDT 1992-93** ISR 5.711.6 9.211.510.2 8.910.0 8.8--- DSR 10.928.222.124.721.820.019.818.5--- Contractual DSR and ISR*** WDT 1993-94 ISRd 6.415.816.319.720.520.923.425.726.8 DSRd 11.239.439.150.548.050.256.764.968.0 WDT 1992-93** ISRd 6.118.720.326.927.727.232.634.5--- DSRd 11.249.449.467.964.664.076.6 ------ *DSR = Debt Service Ratio: (actual) total debt service/exports of goods and services (TDS/XGS); ISR = Interest Service Ratio: (actual) interest payments (INT/XGS) **Data for 1992 provisional estimates ***d indicates that actual payments plus arrears are used in the numerator pprojected Source: WDT 1992-93, 1993-94

8 Somalia: Growth Rates of GDP and Livestock GDP, Selected Periods (per cent per annum) 1977-80 1980-82 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 (3 yrs) (2 yrs) (1 yr) (1 yr) (1 yr) (1 yr) GDP at factor costs IMF ---- 7.9 4.9 10.9 4.1 ---- IBRD -3.0 6.4 4.3 8.5 n.a. n.a. National I 0.0 7.7 8.0 7.3 -14.5 12.6 Nation. II -2.4 13.4 18.7 8.5 0.4 -6.4 Livestock GDP National I -3.3 14.0 21.1 7.3 -40.4 42.1 Nation. II -11.4 31.0 58.3 8.4 1.4 -6.2 Source: Jamal 1992, p.144

9 HARROD-DOMAR and Development Thinking s/k = g = n srate of savings kcapital output ratio grate of growth npopulation growth

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11 W ASHINGTON C ONSENSUS (John W ILLIAMSON ) Fiscal discipline: (typically a primary budget surplus of several percent of GDP) Public expenditure priorities (high economic returns; primary health, education) Tax reform (especially cutting marginal tax rates) Financial liberalization (moderately positive real interest rates, no preferential interest rates) Exchange rates (unified and competitive) Trade liberalization (?slowing down during crises) Foreign direct investment (equal treatment) Deregulation Privatization Property rights

12 The obstinate conservatism with which the classical comparative cost thinking has been retai­ned in theory as something more than a pedagogical introduction - or a model for the treatment of a few special problems - is evidence that, even today, there is in many quarters an insuffi­cient understanding of this fundamental fact. It follows that not only the comparative cost model but also the factor proportions model can only be applied in special cases and used as a general introduction to illuminate the character of trade in some essential aspects... It is characteristic of the developing countries that a good many factors do not exist at all and that the quality of others differs from factors in the industrialized countries. This means that a simple method of analysis - such as the factor proportions model - which does not take this into account is to some extent unrealistic. Bertil Ohlin (1967) Interregional and International Trade, Cambridge (Mass), Harvard UP 308f. (stress in or.)

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15 Table 1.a: Graham's Case (Viner's presentation) Basic Assumptions: Countries A and B both have 400 Units of (nationally standardised, or homogeneous) Labour (LU); the international price (  net barter terms of trade) remains at 4C = 3.5W (P intl = 0.875) 1) Constant Returns (Ricardian-Torrens) Case:AB production per LU (  productivity)C44 W43 Pb = 0.75 (4C = 3W) Pintl = 0.875 Pa = 1 Production Changes (LUs used to produce C and W respectively) Specialisation I Specialisation IITotal Specialisation CountryAB(A+B)ABDiffer *) ABDiff. *) C800800160040012000016000 (LU)(200)(200)(100)(300)(400) W80060014001200 300 +100 1600 0+200 (LU)(200)(200)(300)(100) (400)

16 Table 1.b: Graham's Case (Viner's presentation) 2) Graham's Case: Specialisation (II) Specialisation (III) ABAB C4.53,550.5 W4.5250.25 0.571 < P intl = 0.875 < 10.5 < P intl = 0.875 < 1 Production changes: Specialisation IISpecialisation IIITotal Specialisation. ABDiff. * )ABDiff. * )A B Diff. * ) C4501050-1005199,5-1395,50 200 -1400 (LU)(100)(300)(1)(399)(400) W1350200+15019950,25+595,252000 0 +600 (LU)(300)(100)(399)(1)(400) *) compared with Specialisation I

17 Austauschverhältnisse (Terms of Trade) 1) Commodity or Net-Barter ToT: P x /P m P x price (index) of exports P m price (index) of imports 2) Double Factoral (US: Factorial) ToT P x N x /P m N m NBToT weighted by productivity indices (N); compare rewards of homogeneous factor units Unequal Exchange : DFToT ≠ 1 Income ToT: P x Q x /P m Q x exported quantity; real export income Gross Barter ToT: Q x /Qm Single Factoral ToT (only exports weighted with N x ) Employment Corrected DFToT: P x N x multiplied by index of employment in developing country (cf. Spraos 1983; Singer 1989)

18 Factors contributing to falling NBToTs (sometimes wrongly called different "versions" of the PST) - low income elasticity of commodity exports; initially hotly attacked, meanwhile generally accepted (e.g, IMF, 1987; IBRD 1987) Expanding of raw material exports ▬► excess supply - low elasticities of demand of periphery exports - necessary imports to promote development only produced by Centre – PCs’ income elasticity of imports high. Developmental needs ▬► excess demand -cultural dependence or wasting resources for luxury consumption -oversupply of labour in PCs keeping wages down -(absence of) market power of factors of production: workers (trade unions) and entrepreneurs in the North have sufficient market power to keep Northern prices from falling along with technical progress; lack of such power in PCs forces their prices down - protection by the Centre restricts export outlets ▬► additional force to the deteriorating trend; Centre’s protectionism increases market disequilibria created by the disparity of export possibilities and import needs of SCs - Singer (1991) added debt pressure

19 Ungleicher Tausch: Produktspezifizität und Preisdurchsetzungsmacht -|  i | =  - |  wi | -  e rij s rj  s i -1  i Spezifische Elastizität eines Exportgutes des Landes i  wi Kreuzpreiselastizität der Welt­nachfrage e rij Kreuzpreiselastizitäten des Angebots aller anderen Quellen s rj Anteil am Gesamtangebot s i Anteil des Exportlandes i am Weltexport

20 Unterschiede zu den üblichen Elastizitätsschätzungen  Bogenelastizitäten  Substitution hängt von Verfügbarkeit (auch im Sinne wirtschaftlicher Vertretbarkeit) ab  Zeitabhängig (Reaktionszeit)

21 Definition Official Development Assistance (ODA): "those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their exe­cutive agencies, each tran­saction of which meets the following tests: a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of de­veloping countries as its main objective, and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 per cent." DAC (Development Assistance Committee) der OECD Zuschußelement (grant element): Unterschied OEH-Kredit und Kredit mit 10% Zinsen (gemessen in Kapitalwerten) Beispiele, gerade >25% (OECD 1985, p.172): - 4 %, 7 Jahre Laufzeit, 3 Jahre tilgungsfrei - 5 %, 11 Jahre Laufzeit, 4 Jahre tilgungsfrei - 5 %, 15 Jahre Laufzeit, keine tilgungsfreie Zeit

22 DAC -ODA 1950-2013 (%) Source: DAC

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24 ODA by DAC Members Broadened and Deflated Totals (% of GSP) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 DAC-value 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33*) 0.31 0.30 minus admin. costs 0.307 0.318 0.317 0.317 0.296 0.286 refugees 0.306 0.315 0.311 0.307 0.284 0.274 emerg.& dis.relief 0.302 0.311 0.303 0.303 0.278 0.269 emergency food aid 0.302 0.310 0.301 0.298 0.274 0.265 debt forgiveness 0.297 0.284 0.266 0.282 0.259 0.247 capital subscr. 0.271 0.255 0.251 0.245 0.233 0.222 contrib. to NGOs 0.264 0.249 0.245 0.240 0.228 0.217 students (imputed) 0.260 0.245 0.242 0.236 0.224 0.213 former Commun. C. 0.260 0.245 0.239 0.235 0.221 0.211 ODA-Inflator 1.231 1.347 1.381 1.404 1.403 1.424 Sources: Raffer (1998), based on OECD-data (various publications)

25 ODA by DAC Members Broadened and Deflated Totals (% of GSP) 198919901991199219931994 Official DAC-value 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.30 Deflated ODA 0.260 0.245 0.239 0.235 0.221 0.211 ODA-Inflator 1.231 1.347 1.381 1.404 1.403 1.424 Source: Raffer 1998a Table 6.2: Corrected ODA and OA by DAC Members (% of GSP) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Deflated ODA 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.21 OA 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 Total 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.25 Quelle: Raffer & Singer 2001/2004, p.89

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27 Country Programmable Aid (CPA) “is the portion of aid donors programme for individual countries, and over which partner countries could have a significant say. Developed in 2007 in close collaboration with OECD DAC members, CPA is much closer to capturing the flows of aid that go to the partner countries than the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA).” Source: OECD CPA: “(1) inherently unpredictable (such as humanitarian aid and debt relief); or (2) entails no flows to the recipient country (administration, student costs, development awareness and research and refugee spending in donor countries); or (3) is usually not discussed between the main donor agency and recipient governments (food aid, aid from local governments, core funding to international NGOs, aid through secondary agencies, ODA equity investments and aid which is not allocable by country). Finally, (4), CPA does not net out loan repayments, as these are not usually factored into aid allocation decisions.”

28 ODA Composition 2011 Source: OECD 2013

29 Trends after 1990:  Financing Global Public Goods  Buying political influence, concessions, or economic gains (Alesina & Dollar 2000: voting in UN)  “prevention of terrorism” as “a relevant development objective” Necessity to "balance" security and human rights once “established when the world was a safer place” Robert Cornall (2003), Australia's Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department  Cold War considerations receding  “Gulf War peak “

30 OECD (1992, p.5): "growing uncertainty as to the context and rationale for development assistance in the post Cold War world." IBRD (1990, pp.127f): "Many 'aid' programs in donor countries cover an assortment of activities (including commercial and strategic initiatives) which often have, at best, a tenuous connection with development." OECD (1996, p.55) on role of official finance: "helps to seed and reinforce“, expanding private flows from abroad. Aid seen as a handmaiden of private profit interests (cf. also OECD 1998, p.57)

31 The Millennium Development Goals Eight Goals for 2015 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 2. Achieve universal primary education 3. Promote gender equality and empower women 4. Reduce child mortality 5. Improve maternal health 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 7. Ensure environmental sustainability 8. Develop a global partnership for development Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hungerEradicate extreme poverty and hunger Target 1: Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day Indicators: 1. Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day 2. Poverty gap ratio, $1 per day 3. Share of poorest quintile in national income or consumption Target 2: Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger Indicators: 4. Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age 5. Proportion of the population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption

32 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) 1. Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption. 2. Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems. 3. Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication. 4. Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured. 5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results. Accra Agenda for Action (2008) Ownership Inclusive partnerships: All partners - including donors in the OECD DAC and developing countries, as well as other donors, foundations and civil society - participate fully. Delivering results: Aid is focused on real and measurable impact on development. Capacity development: ability of SCs to manage own future - also lies at the heart of AAA

33 Busan Partnership (2011) “result of an inclusive year-long process of consultation” – “sets out principles, commitments and actions that offer a foundation for effective co-operation in support of international development.” Is the Busan Partnership document legally binding? How will implementation be ensured? “The Busan Partnership document does not take the form of a binding agreement or international treaty. It is not signed, and does not give rise to legal obligations. Rather, it is a statement of consensus that a wide range of governments and organisations have expressed their support for, offering a framework for continued dialogue and efforts to enhance the effectiveness of development co-operation. The Busan Partnership document foresees the establishment of a Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, which will support and help ensure accountability for implementation at the political level. A light framework will be agreed through which progress will be monitored and mutual accountability supported.”

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35 IFI SIND NICHT BEVORZUGTE GLÄUBIGER IWF nachzulesen auf IWF-homepage (auf Seite 820 des Files): www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2001/ch16.pdf Rutsel-Sylvestre (1990): Gründer(innen) des IMF stipulierten NACHRANGIGKEIT der Fondsforderungen; explizite Nachrangigkeit (Schedule B, paragraph 3) mit 2. Statutenänderung verschwunden SDRM war der Versuch, sich die wider besseres Wissen behauptete rechtliche Bevorzugung endlich und insbesondere zu Lasten des privaten Sektors zu erschleichen Folgen des Verhinderns von Haftung, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und marktwirtschaftlicher Prinzipien: “IFI flops securing IFI jobs” (Raffer 1993)  steigende Verschuldung der EL, erschwertes “Schuldenmanagement”, aber mehr Einkommen und Einfluß für IWF  ökonomisch perverses Anreizsystem

36 Beispiele: a) J. Stiglitz: IWF soll umfangreiche Textpassagen aus Dokument für Land A in Dokument über Land B eingefügt haben (manchmal vergessen Namen zu ändern) b) Blumenthal Bericht (Zaire 1982) c) Asienkrise: IBRD (1999) GAB offiziell ZU Jahre vorher gewußt zu haben, daß von IFI stark propagierte, rasche Liberalisierung wieder Krise auslösen würde; warnte Mitglieder aber nicht! IWF MUSZTE es WISSEN (Chile Crash!) IMF-IEO (2004) The IMF and Argentina, 1991–2001 http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2004/arg/eng/index.htm “program was also based on policies that were either known to be counterproductive... or that had proved to be ‘ineffective and unsustainable everywhere they had been tried’... [A]s expressed by FAD [Fiscal Affairs Department] at the time.” (p.91) Board unterstützte “a program that Directors viewed as deeply flawed” (pp.81f) - “September 2001 augmentation suffered from a number of weaknesses in pro- gram design, which were evident at the time. If the debt were indeed unsustain- able, as by then well recognized by IMF staff, the program offered no solution to that problem.” (p.89, Herv. KR) – IWF "staff estimates“, Schuldenreduktion zwischen 15 und 40% wäre nötig ▬►crédito abusivo (J.P. Bohoslavsky)

37 Haftung, Schadenersatz IWF laut Art. IX, Abs 3: vollständige Immunität “except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract” Schiedsgerichtliches Verfahren (wie zB IBRD) zur Feststellung ob Haftungsgründe vorliegen, ob bzw. wie viel Schadenersatz an rechtswidrig geschädigte Mitglieder zu zahlen ist.  Risikovorsorge („precautionary reserves“) Alle IFI außer IWF statutarisch verpflichtet, auch IWF hat vorgesorgt - ALLE haben Kunden Kosten der Risikoabsicherung verrechnet, weigern sich aber die schon bezahlte Versicherungsleistung zu gewähren

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47 a) Net Importing SCs minus Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan b)As defined by the OECD; The sums in the Table were obtained by adding the figures for 'OPEC' (after 1983'Arab Countries') and'Arab Agencies' (initially 'OPEC Financed Agencies') Source: Raffer 1992

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