Analysis of the Practicability of External Emergency Planning in Germany based on Experiences from the Fukushima Accident F. Gering, B. Gerich, E. Wirth.

Präsentation zum Thema: "Analysis of the Practicability of External Emergency Planning in Germany based on Experiences from the Fukushima Accident F. Gering, B. Gerich, E. Wirth."—  Präsentation transkript:

1 Analysis of the Practicability of External Emergency Planning in Germany based on Experiences from the Fukushima Accident F. Gering, B. Gerich, E. Wirth und G. Kirchner BfS – Federal Office for Radiation Protection, Germany fgering@bfs.de

2 Are we well prepared for Fukushima-like releases in Germany ?

3 Off-site emergency planning in Germany <100 km: Intake of stable iodine for children and pregnant women <25 km: Intake of stable iodine for adults < 45 years <10 km: Evacuation, Sheltering

4 Off-site emergency planning in Germany (2) Example for evacuation planning at NPP Biblis

5 Study of BfS (ongoing) Assessment of radiological consequences for several long-lasting (up to 30d), severe releases (all INES 7) with the RODOS system NPP Unterweser and NPP Philippsburg Based on real weather data from 2010 RODOS simulations up to 150 km Estimated doses were compared against German dose reference levels

6 KKU, Fukushima, June KKU, const. emiss., Dec. Results: Eff. Dose (adults), external exposure and inhalation

7 Day 4Day 6Day 8 Eff. Dose (adults), external exposure and inhalation Sheltering

8 Summary of radiological consequences with respect to sheltering

9 Intake of stable iodine (children, pregnant women) Cities affected: - Wilhelmshaven - Bremerhaven - Bremen (partially) - Oldenburg (partially) approx. 175 000 children Thyroid dose for infants from inhalation of radioiodine 200 km

10 Conclusions (1) The size of areas, where reference levels for protective actions sheltering, evacuation and iodine prophylaxis are exceeded, by far exceeds the emergency planning for many of the accident scenarios considered in this study. Current plans for implementing protective actions in the sector (from the EPZ), which is directly hit by the contaminated plume, and in the neighbouring sectors does not fully account for long lasting releases where often all sectors around the NPP are affected to similar extent. In case of long lasting severe releases the critical situation can occur, that reference levels for protective actions are not exceeded in any 7- day-interval (for which some of the reference levels are currently defined in Germany), but the total dose over the release period by far exceeds the reference level.

11 Conclusions (2) In case of long lasting severe releases an one-time intake of stable iodine often is not sufficient for protecting the population against large thyroid doses. Multiple intake of stable iodine tablets is currently not sufficiently considered in emergency planning. (Intake of stable iodine at different times for different areas?) In case of long lasting severe releases the protective action sheltering imposes additional problems (e.g. the danger of being forced to order late evacuation even during passage of the plume, lifting of sheltering in one area while ordering in an another area), which may endanger the applicability of the action in general. Concepts for lifting of countermeasures have to account for scenarios with long lasting releases.

12 Outlook Consequences of long lasting releases on emergency planning might be discussed in an European research project possibly starting this year. We are very much interested to learn about similar considerations in other countries ! Contact: fgering@bfs.defgering@bfs.de

13 Appendix

14 Dose reference levels in Germany

15 Evakuierung nicht in Notfallplanung vorgesehen SzenarioAbbildung Gebiet mit Überschreitung des Richtwerts Maximal- Entfernung (km) Fläche (km 2 )Anzahl betroffener Sektoren KKW Unterweser Fukushima, Juni 20104.1a 20 241 FKA-30d, Juni 20104.1b 7 204 FKA-15d, Juni 20104.1c 7 324 konst. QT,Juni 20104.1d 5 201 Fukushima, Dez 20104.3a 6 245 FKA-30d, Dez 20104.3b 8 242 FKA-15d, Dez 20104.3c 9 283 konst. QT,Dez 20104.3d 8 447 KKW Philippsburg Fukushima, Okt. 20105.1a 12 282 FKA-30d, Okt. 20105.1b 9 287 FKA-15d, Okt. 20105.1c 16 928 konst. QT,Okt. 20105.1d 5 4410 Fukushima, Dez. 20105.3a 10 364 FKA-30d, Dez. 20105.3b 25 1606 FKA-15d, Dez. 20105.3c 20 965 konst. QT,Dez. 20105.3d 24 1506

16 Einnahme von Iodtabletten nicht in Notfallplanung vorgesehen SzenarioAbbildung Gebiet mit Überschreitung des Richtwerts Maximal- Entfernung (km) Fläche (km 2 )Anzahl betroffener Sektoren KKW Unterweser Fukushima, Juni 20104.2a> 180 400012 FKA-30d, Juni 20104.2b 125 340012 FKA-15d, Juni 20104.2c 180 600012 konst. QT,Juni 20104.2d 75 380012 Fukushima, Dez 20104.4a> 150 740012 FKA-30d, Dez 20104.4b> 160 880012 FKA-15d, Dez 20104.4c 120 700012 konst. QT,Dez 20104.4d 140 1210012 KKW Philippsburg Fukushima, Okt. 20105.2a 140 400010 FKA-30d, Okt. 20105.2b> 160 650012 FKA-15d, Okt. 20105.2c> 160 1070011 konst. QT,Okt. 20105.2d 98 570012 Fukushima, Dez. 20105.4a 155 480012 FKA-30d, Dez. 20105.4b 190 800012 FKA-15d, Dez. 20105.4c 120 580012 konst. QT,Dez. 20105.4d 185 770012

17 Umsiedlung 50 mSv (200 km 2 ) 20 mSv (1200 km 2 ) 100 mSv (56 km 2 ) Eff. Dosis (Erw.) durch Bodenstrahlung über 1 Jahr

18 Eff. Dosis durch externe Strahlung und Inhalation KKP, FKA-15d, Okt. KKP, FKA-30d, Dez.

19 KKP, FKA-15d, Okt. KKP, FKA-30d, Dez. Schilddrüsendosis für Kleinkinder durch Inhalation