Publications by DIW Berlin on coal and lignite (Selection)

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0 Fossil fuels and sustainable Energy
Session A: The economics and politics of phasing out coal Sustainable Energy Education & Research for All (SEER4ALL); TU Berlin, 8th June, 2017 KW Jänschwalde; election Sweden; TB Jänschwalde 1 Dr. Pao-Yu Oei Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP); TU Berlin Division Energy, Transport and Environment; German Economic Research Institute (DIW Berlin)

1 Publications by DIW Berlin on coal and lignite (Selection)
Articles (selection) Oei et al. (2016): „Kohlereserve“ vs. CO2-Grenzwerte in der Stromwirtschaft – Ein modellbasierter Vergleich“, Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 1-2/2016 Collins, and Mendelevitch (2015): Leaving Coal Unburned: Options for Demand-Side and Supply-Side Policies, DIW Berlin, DIW Roundup 87, Berlin, Germany. Richter, Mendelevitch and Jotzo (2015): Market Power Rents and Climate Change Mitigation: A Rationale for Coal Taxes?, DIW Berlin, DIW Discussion Paper 1471, Berlin, Germany. Holz, Haftendorn, Mendelevitch, and Hirschhausen (2015): The COALMOD-World Model: Coal Markets until 2030, in R. K. Morse and M.C. Thurber (Eds.) “The Global Coal Market - Supplying the Major Fuel for Emerging Economies”. Cambridge University Press. Oei et al. (2014): Modeling a Carbon Capture, Transport, and Storage Infrastructure for Europe“. Journal of Environmental Modeling and Assessment 05/2014 Politikberatung kompakt and DIW Wochberichte (selection): Oei et al. (2015): 104: Auswirkungen von CO2-Grenzwerten für fossile Kraftwerke auf Strommarkt und Klimaschutz in Deutschland. Politikberatung 104. Oei et al. (2014): 84: Braunkohleausstieg – Gestaltungsoptionen im Rahmen der Energiewende. Politikberatung 84. Oei et al. (2014): Kohle und Klimaschutz. DIW Wochbericht 14-26

2 Introduction: climate change and fossil fuels
70-90% of coal, 30-60% of gas and % of oil reserves has to stay under the ground to reach the 2°C target Market prices for fossil fuels and especially coal are too low and do not account for external effects. The agreement that was reached in Paris on Sunday highlights the importance of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to be able to keep global warming below 2° or even better below 1,5° C. This implies that the majority of fossil reserves – and especially of coal having the highest carbon intensity - must not be burnt. Existing market prices, however, are too low to curb coal consumption as they sometimes do not account for the negative external effects. The international monetary fund calculated that these costs sum up to around 5 trillion$ globally which corresponds 6.5% of GDP. This is the reason why we need additional policy regulation ________________ Nur ein Teil der klimaexternalitäten 5.3 trillion $ = 6.5 of global GDP Source: McGlade & Ekins (2015) Source: IMF (2015)

3 Electricity Generation in the EU: Coal vs. Gas Phase-out
Source: Agora Energiewende 2016

4 Coal capacities in Europa Coal free countries in the EU: BE, CY, EE, LT, LU, LV, MT
2025 2025 ? 2016 2025 2020 Source: CAN database / Sandbag (2016)

5 Structure of Power Generation in selected EU-Countries (2013)
Source: Euracoal (2015)

6 Lignite and hard coal production and imports in Europe (2015)
Source: Euracoal (2016)

7 Reserves of lignite and hard coal in Europe (2012)
Source: Euracoal (2013)

8 Germany‘s national GHG reduction target implies further measures…
Trend of the last years: emissions going up! 2020 Ziel*: - 40% 2020: aspired: 40%  likely: 33% (1990) || euqivalent to aspired 21% and likely only 12% (compared to 2013 emissions level) 2030 target*: - 55% 2050 target*: % Source: Oei, et al.(2014). *) Base line: 1990

9 Lignite in Germany Rhine basin Helmstedt basin Lusatia Central Germany Power plant Mining site The electricity sector is responsible for ~40% of GHG emissions in Germany ~50% lignite power plants; of which >50% built before 1990 (esp. in NRW). ~33% hard coal power plants; of which 50% built after 2000 Effect of electricity prices below 30 €/MWh: Old hard coal power plants are shut down for economic reasons Political measures could regulate which power plants are closed down: Lignite power plants Newly built hard coal power plants Gas fired power plants Lignite power plant capacities built [GW] before 1980 after 2001 Rhine basin 7 0.3 3 Helmstedt basin – Central Germany Lusatia 1 6 0.6

10 The Phasing-Out of Coal is Politically Unanymous: Different additional instruments are under discussion Proposed Measure Expected Effect Forbidding new lignite mines Terminating current plans for new minings sites in Eastern Germany Closing existing lignite mines Reducing mining volumes of active mines in North-Rhine Westfalia (NRW) EU-ETS reform Price signal through the introduction of market stability reserve (MSR); additional measures: 900 mn EUA from backloading directly in MSR, start of MSR in 2017 instead of 2021 CO2 floor price CO2 certificates would become more expensive Minimum efficiency Closure of inefficient power plants Flexibility requirements Closure or singling out of inflexible power plants Coal phase-out law Maximum production [TWh] or emissions allowances [tCO2] for plants Emissions performance standard (per unit; for new plants and retrofits) Restrictions for new plants and retrofits (without CO2 capture) [< x g/MWh] Emissions performance standard (emissions cap for existing plants) Reduce load factor for depreciated coal-fired power plants (e.g., >30y) [< x g/MW] Capacity mechanisms or reserve for coal plants Incentive for construction of less CO2-intensive power plants when including environmental criteria Climate contribution fee Additional levy for old CO2-intensive power plants Source: Updated from Oei et al. (2014).

11 No need for new lignite mining pits in Germany; constitutional conformity of new fields are being contested Projected fields and Displacements : Welzow Süd II (~210 Mio. t CO2 / 800 inhabitants) Nochten II (~300 Mio. t CO2 / 1,700 inhabitants) Jänschwalde Nord (~270 Mio. t CO2 / 900 inhabitants) (Vision: Bagenz-Ost and Spremberg-Ost) Exproprietation (relocalisation of inhabitants): Public interest needed for legality of new fields Energiewende: neither public interest nor necessity Possibility to sell electricity from lignite is not a reason to justify expropritations

12 Different instruments to reduce CO2 emissions are discussed; among them emissions performance standard (EPS) 1. Standard to be respected at any moment (plant-specific limit per kWh) Prevents construction of new coal power plants (without CO2 capture) Discussed in USA for new-built, in force in Canada as of mid-2015 2. Limit of annual emissions Can incentivize emission reductions of existing power plants In force in the UK since 2013 Many different instruments are currently being discussed. I want to concentrate on one particular instrument: CO2 Emissions performance standards, called EPS Introducing a specific EPS per kWh as currently discussed in the US and already in force in Canada forbids the construction of any new coal power plant without CO2 capture An alternative scheme that was introduced in the UK only limits the annual output of any power plant. I would like to show you results of the effects of introducing a scheme similar to the British model also in Germany. The graph shows that the emissions of the base case in black can be reduced when introducing an EPS for all elderly power plants aged older than 35 in grey; and another scenario with even lower emissions if the EPS is binding for all existing power plants in green ________________ Bspw. gas-450 und 80% auslastung erwähnen bei ELMOD ELMOD: Introduction of a German EPS that uses a gas power plant (450 gCO2/kWh) as benchmark to achieve Germany´s climate targets: limit annual emissions of all plants (EPS) only those older than 35 years (EPS 35)

13 Climate and energy policy has various proven instruments at hand to account for external effects of electricity generation from fossil fuels. Research Question Examining current trends of the German energy market with respect to their compatibility with climate targets. Identifying additional instruments besides a reform of the EU-ETS. Main Findings Coal-based power generation puts climate targets at risk. A market-driven transition from coal to gas is unlikely to occur in the near future. Additional instruments could be a CO2 floor price, minimum efficiency levels and flexibility requirements, a coal phase-out law, emissions performance standard, capacity mechanisms or a strategic reserve for coal plants, a climate contribution fee or reduced transmission grid expansion Concluding on the first part I can say that climate and energy policy has various proven instruments at hand to account for the external effects of fossil fuels and in particular coal. The different instruments include the presented EPS but also a reform of the EU-ETS, co2 floor price, minimum efficiency level and flexibility requirements, a coal phase-out law, capacity mechanisms, a strategic reserve for coal power plants, a climate contribution fee or reduced transmission grid expansion. These finding were also already or about to be published in various articles. Publications Chapter in the book Energiewende (forthcoming) DIW Economic Bulletin, Wochenbericht, Politikberatung kompakt ( ) Newspaper articles ( )

14 Share of rising renewables lead to new job opportunities
Quelle: BMWI (2013) & BDEW (2014), Daten für 2014 sind auf Basis des ersten Halbjahres geschätzt: German Ministry of Economy and Energy (BMWI).[1]

15 Comparing number of jobs in the coal and renewables sector
Die Lignite sector used to employ more than people in The hardcoal industry in the 1950s-60s employed people. Source: Own depiction based on Ulrich und Lehr (2014) and Statistik der Kohlewirtschaft (2015).

16 Average age in the lignite sector: 75 % are aged over 40
Source: Own depiction based on Statistik der Kohlewirtschaft (2015).

17 Main Messages There is a global trend to phase-out coal power plants in the Western world, which is economically efficient. The renewables-based energy sector reform in Germany, commonly called Energiewende, implies the end of lignite and coal electrification. In Germany, too, there are major economic, technical and legal risks for coal power plant operators. It sems to us that a consistent strategy is needed, which includes the closure of older pants, the use of existing mines to supply younger plants, the diversification of the technology mix, and investments into lucrative renewables to foster a sustainable energy transition. A just energy transition provides creates new jobs and opportunities for various regions and sectors.

18 Impacts of German coal phase-out scenarios on the European electricity mix
Energy Policy Exchange Forum: Energy & Climate Policy in Germany, China & California: Diverse Approaches, Joint Strengths; Hertie School of Governance; Berlin, 6th-7th October, 2016 KW Jänschwalde; election Sweden; TB Jänschwalde 1 Dr. Pao-Yu Oei Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP); TU Berlin Division Energy, Transport and Environment; German Economic Research Institute (DIW Berlin)

19

20 Upcoming “Coal Reserve“ in Germany Notification 11 days ahead; overall payments of 1.6 billion €
Owner Unit Power [MW] Age in 2020 Start of reserve (shut down after 4 years) Particularities Mibrag / EPH Buschhaus 352 35 10 / 2016 Plant was moved into reserve already in September as the mining site was fully exploited RWE Frimmersdorf P 284 54 10 / 2017 Last 2 (out of 8) units; facing economic problems for several years. Frimmersdorf Q 278 50 Niederaußem E 295 10 / 2018 Were already listed in the official list of expected closures „Kraftwerksliste Bundesnetzagentur zum erwarteten Zu- und Rückbau 2015 bis 2019“ with the closing date 2019 Niederaußem F 299 49 Neurath C 292 47 10 / 2019 Similar efficiency factors as other 300 MW units Vattenfall / EPH Jänschwalde E 465 33 Most recent units at the site Jänschwalde (start of operation of the 6 units ); it is sometimes easier to start shutting down the last units first. Jänschwalde F 31 Quelle: Eigene Recherchen basierend auf Daten der Bundesregierung, der BNetzA und Webseiten der Unternehmen

21 Longterm trends of CO2 emissions in Germany until 2035
The results show that the long-term decline of German CO2 emissions (301 Mt in 2014). The green scenario resembles a faster coal phase-out by additionally restricting the full load hours of coal power plants (e.g. due to limited coal reserves or an additional climate levy), while the black scenario is a moderate business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. The results are also influenced by developments in neighboring states. It is therefore in the interest of Germany that other neighboring countries also take action and complement the EU-ETS with national instruments to enable a generation portfolio in line with the European climate targets (Visions 3 & 4).

22 The Role of Coal for Power Generation in Europe 2013
Source: Euracoal (2014)

23 Possible shortcomings
The Phasing-Out of Coal is Politically Unanymous: Different additional instruments are under discussion Proposed Measure Expected Effect Possible advantages Possible shortcomings Forbidding new lignite mines Terminating current plans for new minings sites in Eastern Germany No displacements of villagers; no retrofits for lignite power plants; investment security for all affected people No effect for regions with sufficient already granted mining rights Closing existing lignite mines Reducing mining volumes of active mines in North-Rhine Westfalia (NRW) Concentration on one mine (instead of three) reduces fixed costs and less displacements; overall volumes insufficient for entire lignite fleet leading to some clusures Does not necessarily hit the oldest inefficient power plants first EU-ETS reform Price signal through the introduction of market stability reserve (MSR); additional measures: 900 mn EUA from backloading directly in MSR, start of MSR in instead of 2021 EU-wide instrument; thus, no cross-border leakage effects targets several sectors besides electricity Structural reforms uncertain from today's perspective; the extent of the impact is unpredictable due to high surplus of certificates CO2 floor price CO2 certificates would become more expensive Investment security for operators Feasible prices probably too low to result in a switch from lignite to natural gas in the short term Minimum efficiency Closure of inefficient power plants More efficient utilization of raw materials Open cycle gas turbines (OCGT) could also be affected; complex and time-consuming test and measurement processes Flexibility requirements Closure or singling out of inflexible power plants Better integration of fluctuating renewable energy sources Combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) could also be affected; complex and time-consuming test and measurement processes Coal phase-out law Maximum production [TWh] or emissions allowances [tCO2] for plants Fixed coal phase-out plan & schedule investment security Outcome of auctioning of allowances would be difficult to predict Emissions performance standard (per unit; for new plants and retrofits) Restrictions for new plants and retrofits (without CO2 capture) [< x g/MWh] Prevention of CO2-intensive (future stranded) investments Minor short-term reduction in emissions Emissions performance standard (emissions cap for existing plants) Reduce load factor for depreciated coal- fired power plants (e.g., >30y) [< x g/MW] Preservation of generation capacities Negative impact on economic efficiency of power plants might lead to closure of older blocks Capacity mechanisms or reserve for coal plants Incentive for construction of less CO2- intensive power plants when including environmental criteria Support for gas power plants or moving of coal power plants into a reserve to reduce their emissions and prevent supply bottlenecks Difficult to establish critieria that are in line with EU state aid laws if payments should only be given to selected units Climate contribution fee Additional levy for old CO2-intensive power plants Limiting output of most CO2-intensive generation facilities; preserving capacities; compatible with EU-ETS Older units might become uneconomical if the fee is too high Reduced transmission grid expansion Increased congestion might prohibit lignite electricity generation in times of high renewable energy production Redispatch of less CO2-intensive capacities; lower investment costs for transmission lines Transmission grids might be needed for renewables in the long run Source: Oei et al. (2014).

24 „Energy Transformation“ in Germany (Energiewende)
Reduction of nuclear energy Share of Renewable Energy Reduction GHG-Emissions Reduction of Energy Demand Gross final energy Electricity Production Primary Energy Domestic Heat Final Energy Transport Electricity Demand 2015 2017 2019 -47% -56% -60% 2020 18% 35% -40% -20% -10% 2021 2022 2025 -80% -100% 40-45% 2030 2035 30% 50% 55-60% -55% 2040 45% 65% -70% 2050 60% 80% -80% bis 95% -50% -25% Basis 2010 - 1990 2008 2005 40-45% 2025 55-60% 2035 Source: Own Depiction based on BReg (2010, 2011, 2013)

25 Lignite power plants are not flexible enough for an electricity system with a high share of renewable sources *) Read data as follows : „current power plants / state of the art / optimization potential“ Lignite CCGT** OCGT** Change of load [%Pmax p. minute] 1 / 2,5 / 4 2 / 4 / 8 8 / 12 / 15 Hot start-up (<8h) [h] 6 / 4 / 2 1,5 / 1 / 0,5 < 0,1 Cold start-up (>48h) 10 / 8 / 6 4 / 3 / 2 Source: VDE (2012)* **) CCGT: Combined Cycle Gas Turbine OCGT: Open Cycle Gas Turbine Source: Agora Energiewende (2014).

26 … including a coal phase-out probably until 2040
Germany risks missing the -40% GHG reduction target until 2020 (base: 1990). This is why additional national instruments, employed alongside the EU ETS, come into play and are currently discussed by all relevant actors. Official projections by the Federal Network Agency / Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) include a reduction of lignite capacities from 21,2 GW in 2013 to 12,6 GW in Resulting emission targets for the electricity sector are 187 Mt CO2 (2025) and 134 Mt CO2 (2035) compared to 317 Mt CO2 in This implies a decarbonization of the electricity sector and a coal phase-out. Barbara Hendricks (Federal Minister for the Environment) and the German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU) target the year 2040.

27 Planned reserve of lignite capacites
The current proposal includes moving 2,7 GW of lignite capacity into a “lignite reserve” three times 0,9 GW in 2017, 2018 and 2019 each block is shut down completely after four years in the reserve The reserve of 2,7 GW include 1 GW of lignite capacity in Lusatia (2 blocks of Jänschwalde) by Vattenfall and the power plant Buschhaus (350 MW) in Central Germany which was recently bought by Mibrag (owned by EPH) 1,5 GW of lignite capacity run by RWE in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)

28 Economic Risks for utilities: Significantly reduced profitability for old and newer plants
Current Phelix Futures: 2017: EUR 24,05 2018: EUR 23,90 2019: EUR 24,00 2020: EUR 25,20 Development of Phelix Future (Phelix: physical electricity  German wholesale power price) Source: EEX, May 2016

29 Technical and Environmental Risks: Iron Ocre: Threat for aquatic life and tourism in the Spreewald
Source: Source: dapd Source: RBB

30 Comparing jobs in lignite (BK) & renewables (EE) in affected regions in Eastern Germany
Climate measures lead to additional annual investments of 15 – 30 billion € in Germany. Meeting the 2020 climate targets would result in additional: – new jobs economic increase of 20 – 40 billion €. Source: Own depiction based on Ulrich und Lehr (2013) and Statistik der Kohlewirtschaft (2013).

31 Kohlelieferungen aus Mitteldeutschland nach Tschechien
2012 sind t als Probelieferung aus dem Mitteldeutschen Revier nach Tschechien geliefert worden. „Das tschechische Kraftwerk hat mit der mitteldeutschen Kohle funktioniert.“ Das tschechische Kraftwerk Opatovice befindet sich 100 Kilometer östlich von Prag und ist ungefähr 300 km vom Mitteldeutschen Revier entfernt Bei einem Interesse aus Tschechien kündigte Mibrag-Chef Joachim Geisler an, werde man auch weitere Kohle zukünftig dorthin liefern. Dies wären dann deutlich größere Lieferungen. In 2015 bestätigte die Mibrag, dass keine weitere Transporte nach Tschechien geplant sind.

32 Es gibt keinen Bedarf für neue Tagebaue in der Lausitz
Darstellungen basierend auf eigenen Berechnungen

33 Das Braunkohlegebiet in NRW besitzt die größten Reserven
Quelle: Eigene Darstellung

34 Die Braunkohle aus dem mitteldeutschen Revier wird bis zu 150 km transportiert
Belieferung KW Schkopau [mio. t/a] Belieferung KW Lippendorf [mio. t/a] Belieferung KW Buschhaus [mio. t/a] KW Mumsdorf wurde 2013 nach 45 Jahren abgeschaltet

35 E.ON verkauft das Helmstedter Braunkohlerevier an MIBRAG
Im September 2013 hat E.ON den Verkauf des Helmstedter Braunkohlereviers bei Braunschweig an die Mibrag angekündigt. Der Verkauf umfasst den Tagebau Schöningen mit allen bestehenden Rückbau- und Rekultivierungsverpflichtungen sowie das Kraftwerk Buschhaus. Die Veräußerung ist Teil einer Umstrukturierung. E.ON trennt sich auch von Anteilen des Gazprom-Konzerns, von Regionaltöchtern und vom Gasnetzbetreiber Open Grid Europe, um zusätzliche Erlöse zu erzielen. Das Kraftwerk Buschhaus wurde 1985 in Betrieb genommen und hat eine Brutto-Leistung von 390 MW. Ursprünglich war die Stilllegung des Kraftwerkes zum Jahr 2017, gemeinsam mit dem Auslaufen des Tagebaus, geplant. Die Mibrag will Buschhaus ab 2014 bis 2030 hauptsächlich mit Kohle aus dem 150 km entfernten mitteldeutschen Revier aus bereits genehmigten Braunkohlefeldern weiterbetreiben. Durch den Aufkauf des Kraftwerks bleiben ca.120 Arbeitsplätze am Standort Buschhaus in Niedersachsen erhalten. Es gibt jedoch auch Kritik an einer verstärkten Auskohlung der Tagebaufelder zu Gunsten niedersächsischer Arbeitsplätze.

36 Investments in fossil fuels to decline on a global scale
Quelle: Extract from figure SPM.9 of IPCC Working Group III report 2014, p. 30

37 Carbon Capture, Transport, and Storage (CCTS) stellt auf absehbare Zeit keine Option für die Dekarbonisierung dar No CO2-priority infrastructure projects Hürth (De, RWE) Jänschwalde (De, Vattenfall) No EU-funding through NER-300 Drax pulls out of White Rose project (UK) Longannet (UK, 1 bn. £) "Ob [CCS] in Deutschland zur Anwendung kommt ist eher zweifelhaft. [...]“ Mongstad (Norway) Schleswig-Holstein (De) forbids CO2-storage 0 finished, 10 delayed, 9 canceled projects Source: Own illustration based on Tagesspiegel (2010), BBC (2011), Märkische Rundschau (2011), Vattenfall (2011), Bundesregierung (2012), EC (2012), Bellona (2013), EC (2013), GCI (2013), EUWID (2014), BBC (2015); GCCSI (2011, 2015).

38 Lignite power plants are not flexible enough for an electricity system with a high share of renewable sources (2/2) Fraunhofer ISE (2013).

39 A Vision for the Future ??? (Train Station in Welzow, Sep. 2014)

40 70-90% of coal, 30-60% of gas and 30-60% of oil reserves has to stay under the ground, even if available Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK): 2°C target corresponds to 890 Gt CO2 (*): Source: IPCC SRREN(2011), fig. 1.7 (*)

41 The CCS-Illusion: Pilot Plant in Jänschwalde cancelled on Dec. 5th 2011

42 Development of the CCS Projects since 2011
cancelled. delayed ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 53: Peterhead; 55: White Rose; 40 C-Gen ? ? ? ? Source: Own depiction based on GCI (2011, 2013) and MIT (2014).

43 Phasing-out Coal is Economically „Efficient“: The social costs of lignite, including externalities, are way above the revenue!

44 Vattenfall’s hybrid structure: Lignite dominates German business

45 Vattenfall‘s CO2 reduction target
Jänschwalde 2012: 24.8 Mt CO2 Schwarze Pumpe 2012: 12.8 Mt CO2 If non-lignite emissions stay constant: lignite has to go down by 30% * Boxberg 2012: 15.9 Mt CO2 Lippendorf 2012: 5.3Mt CO2 (Share Vattenfall) „A cornerstone of Vattenfall´s long-term strategy is to reduce negative exposure to rising CO2 prices by reducing emissions from the Group´s portfolio […]” (Vattenfall Annual and sustainability Report, 2013) *) Total CO2 emissions 2013 have risen to 88.4 Megatons Source: Own depiction based on Vattenfall (2014), Thru.de (2014).

46 How to get rid of 15 Mt of CO2? Source: Vattenfall Annual and Sustainability Report 2013

47 Überführung von Braunkohlekraftwerken in die Sicherheitsbereitschaft / „Kohlereserve“
900 MW 350 MW 1.500 MW Summe: MW Buschhaus/MIBRAG (350 MW) Jänschwalde/Vattenfall (900 MW) „300-MW-Flotte“ (Frimmersdorf/Niederaußem/Neurath)/ RWE (1.500MW) Quelle: Eigene Recherchen basierend auf Daten der Bundesregierung und der BNetzA

48 „Kohlereserve“: Technische Anforderungen und wer bekommt/zahlt wieviel
Technische Anforderungen: Startbereit innerhalb von 10 Tagen + 11 Stunden bis zur Mindestteillast + 13 Stunden bis zur Nettonennleistung Kosten: Jährlich 230 Millionen € für sieben Jahre  1,6 Milliarden € Gesamtkosten Kraftwerke sind jeweils vier Jahre in Reserve  150 Mil. €/Jahr pro GW = €/MW ≈ Erlöse am Strommarkt – Variable Kosten Kosten werden über eine Erhöhung des Netzentgeltes um 0,05 Cent/kWh umgelegt. Vom Netzentgelt befreite Akteure sind somit nicht betroffen. Vereinbarkeit mit EU-Beihilferecht: Es gab Gespräche mit der Europäischen Kommission. Ergebnis bei einer möglichen Klage unklar. Quelle: Eigene Recherchen basierend auf Daten der Bundesregierung, der BNetzA und Webseiten der Unternehmen

49 Fazit zu regulatorischen Ansätzen für eine Dekarbonisierung der Stromerzeugung
Zur Erreichung des Klimaschutzziels 2020 (-40% weniger THG ggü. 1990) und auch für die langfristigen Klimaziele sind u.a. zusätzliche Maßnahmen im Stromsektor nötig. Die „Kohlereserve“ von 2,7 GW Braunkohlekapazitäten (mit anschließender Schließung) ist ein erster Schritt in Richtung Dekarbonisierung des Stromsektors. In Bezug auf das Treibhausgas-Minderungsziel 2020 wird der Effekt gering ausfallen, für einen echten Beitrag ist die Reserve zu klein. Die Einigung stellt eine teure „Abwrackprämie“ dar, die insb. von den Haushalten finanziert wird; ein Teil der Anlagen würde in den 2020er Jahren größtenteils ohnehin abgeschaltet. Überprüfung im Jahr 2018, (wo erst 1 GW in der Reserve ist,) ob durch die Klimareserve die geplanten 12,5 Mil. t CO2 – im Vergleich zum Basisszenario – eingespart werden.  Möglichkeit des Nachsteuerns, zur Erreichung der Reduktionsziele für Die Einführung von anderen diskutierten Optionen wie dem ursprünglichen Klimabeitrag oder CO2-Grenzwerten wären für eine Dekarbonisierung des Stromsektors besser geeignet. Über Umweltauflagen sind weitere regulatorische Ansätze zur Dekarbonisierung des Stromsektors abbildbar. Hierbei sind insb. die Europäische Wasserrahmenrichtlinie bzgl. Quecksilber und die Umsetzung der IED RL bzgl. der NOx und SO2 Grenzwerte zu nennen. Die Kosten der technischen Nachrüstungen verteuern die Kohleverstromung und können im Einzelfall zur Unrentabilität von alten ineffizienten Anlagen führen.